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LABOR LAW-APPLICABILITY OF THE LEA ACT TO ACTIVITIES OF THE
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MusICIANs-Defendant, acting as president of a
local union of the American Federation of Musicians, requested a new contract
with a broadcasting station licensed by the Federal Communications Commission, including a provision that the licensee hire three extra musicians, raising
to six the total number of musicians employed. When negotiations regarding
this provision failed, defenaant withdrew from the licensee's services the three
musicians (members of the A.F. of M.) already employed by it. An action was,
then brought to prosecute defendant under the amendment to the Federal
Communications Act, popularly known as the Lea Act, which prohibits the use
of threats or force to compel a licensed broadcasting station to use more employees than it needs.1 After the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the act,2 the cause was remanded for trial by the district court on the question
whether the defendant had been guilty of a violation. Held, verdict of acquittal

1 60 Stat. L. 89 (1946), 47 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1947) § 506. The pertinent
portions of the statute are: "(a) It shall be unlawful, by the use of express or implied
threat of the use of force, violence, intimidatitm, or duress, or by the use of express or
implie_d threat of the use of other means, to coerce, compel or constrain or attempt to
coerce, compel, or constrain a licensee--( I) to employ or agree to employ, in connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee, any person or persons in excess of the number of employees needed by such licensee to perform actual
services."
2 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 1538 (1947).
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directed. There was no evidence that defendant knew that the licensee had
no need for the extra musicians, and this fact must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Petrillo, (D.C. lli. 1948) 75 F. Supp. 176.
The Lea Act is singular in that the avowed purpose of its framers was to
curb the practices of one man, the defendant here, and of the union which he
controls.8 Previous efforts to restrain these activities by prosecution under the
Sherman Act had met with failure,4 although some effective state action had
been taken. 5 Although the court in the principal case concedes that the licensee
needed only the three musicians which it then employed, it is stated that the
defendant's demands were unaccompanied by the use of force. If this is taken
to suggest that strike action is not "duress" within the meaning of the statute,
it hardly seems a tenable position. If it means that the particular strike in
question was of so little economic significance that it did not amount to "duress,"
the statement appears to be substantiated by the facts. 6 The decision places the
greatest emphasis, however, upon the defendant's lack of knowledge that the
licensee needed only three musicians. In other words, the court ~nterprets the
statute as requiring a specific intent to do the prohibited act,7 the significance of
which depends upon the meaning given to the needs of the licensee.8 The decision may mean that if the defendant believed subjectively in the licensee's need
for more employees, he did not possess the necessary intent. Some indication of
this interpretation is given by the emphasis which the court places upon the fact
that the defendant did not ask that men be paid for doing nothing, but rather
8
Statement by Representative Lea in the N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1946, p. 3:6.
Among these practices are the enforcement against broadcasting stations (among others)
of "quotas" or "make-work" projects, and the employment of "stand-by'' musicians,
who receive gratuitous wages in order that the services of one member of their band
or orchestra may be obtained. See, Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (1945), vol. 2. The Taft-Hartley
Act, § 8(b)(6), 29 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1947) § 158, covers some of the same ground
as the Lea Act, by its provision that it is an unfair practice for a union to cause an
'employer to pay for services which are not performed.
4
United States v. American Federation of Musicians, (D.C. Ill. 1942) 47 F.
Supp. 304, affd., 318 U.S. 741, 63 S.Ct. 665 (1943). An injunction against a strike,
allegedly a conspiracy to eliminate the manufacture of phonograph records, was denied
under the authority of the Norris-LaGuardia and Clayton Acts.
5
Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E. (2d) 349 (1941).
The defendant there was Mr. Petrillo's predecessor as president of the A.F. of M.
6
The licensee testified that the dispute caused it no inconvenience, and the work
of the three striking musicians was handled by a switchboard operator and an office
girl.
7
On the other hand, statutes which denounce the doing of acts mala prohibita,
with no express requirement of willful conduct, have been interpreted as dispensing
with the necessity for showing a wrongful intent, or as creating an imputation of that
intent from the doing of the act. Hargrove v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th, 1933)
67 F. (2d) 820; State v. Dowling, 92 Fla. 848, no S. 522 (1926); Boyd v. State,
217 Wis. 149, 258 N.W. 330 (1935).
8
It is this troublesome interpretation of the licensee's needs which led the three
dissenting members of the Supreme Court to hold the Lea Act invalid for indefiniteness. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. I, 67 S.Ct. 1538 (1947).
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that they be provided with services to perform. It seems unlikely, however,
that it was the purpose of Congress to require an intent so difficult to establish
as this.9 A more reasonable interpretation would be to treat the licensee's needs
as an objective fact; to be determined by the court. If this view is taken, the
decision means simply that the union must have knowledge that extra personnel
may not in fact be needed, and the crime would consist of attempting to compel
the employment of men who the licensee says, and who the court may find in
fact, are not needed. In the instant case the court found that the defendant
did not even know of this objective fact, and it is possible that the case does
not stand as authority for any greater requirement of scienter than that he must
have that knowledge. Taking this view of the decision, a licensee would be
able to avoid the results of this case by informing the union that it needs only a
certain number of employees, offering proof, and subsequently establishing the
fact.

W. J. Schrenk, Jr.

9 Where the requirement of proof of intent makes enforcement difficult, statutes
have been construed as dispensing with that requirement. United States v. Greenbaum,
(C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 437. Defendant's counsel hailed the decision as the
death of the Lea Act, and said that it established " . • . that if in good faith the
[A.F. of M.] union wants to request an employer to put on live musicians, and not have
any stand-bys, and wants them to perform actual services, it is not a violation of the
Lea Act." N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1948, p. 1:2.

